Abstract: This paper offers a concise comparative assessment of some key features of the 'Aegean' and 'Chinese' models of coinage.
empire, although coin use appears to have been relatively rare beyond its western (that is, Mediterranean) periphery. Persian silver coins were minted in the first instance in the period of conflict with the Greeks in the first half of the fifth century BC, and hoard finds are concentrated in Asia Minor. Gold issues did not take off until subsidies to Greek states commenced in the late fifth century BC and have predominantly been recovered from hoards in Greece, Cyprus, and Italy. 3 It therefore seems that Achaemenid coinage was above all a functional extension of, and response to, Greek coinage. The same holds true for the satrapal issues in western Asia Minor that are more overtly dependent on Greek models, as well as for Carthage, which began to issue Greek-style silver coins at the end of the fifth century BC, initially outside Africa proper, in the context of largescale warfare against the Sicilian Greeks. 4 The volume and catchment area of 'Aegean' coinage increased dramatically with the conquests of Alexander the Great in the 330s and 320s BC. As the gold and silver bullion stocks of the Achaemenid court were minted out and put into circulation by Alexander and his warring lieutenants, Greek-style coin came to be produced in large quantities all over the former Persian empire, from Eastern Iran to Mesopotamia, Syria, and Egypt. Gold, temporarily important under Alexander, was once again eclipsed by silver under his successors. Under this influence, north-western India, which had previously begun to develop a -possibly though not necessarily indigenous -tradition of punch-marked silver bars and proto-coins, imported the 'Aegean' model, as did a series of foreign dynasties that successively controlled parts of Central Asia and northern India, from the Greco-Bactrian and Greco-Indian regimes (third to first centuries BC) to the Sakas and Pahlavas (first centuries BC and AD) and the Kushan (?first to third centuries AD). The Parthians, who wrested Iran and Mesopotamia from the Seleucids in the second century BC, likewise continued 'Aegean' monetary traditions with silver coins struck on the Attic standard. From the third through the seventh centuries AD, their regional successors, the Sasanid dynasty, continued to mint silver coins, supplemented by occasional gold issues. To the East, the Greco-Bactrian, Saka and Pahlavas issues were likewise dominated by silver. Gold assumed somewhat greater importance from the third century AD onward, in the late Kushan period and especially with the Kushano-Sasanid issues of the second half of the fourth century AD. The White Huns subsequently returned to silver coinage while the Gupta dynasty in India (fourth to eighth centuries AD) favored gold dinars.
In the west, the spread of Greek-style coins into the interior of Europe -among Celtic and Iberian groups -is difficult to date, although it appears that this process did not gain momentum until the second century BC, resulting in varied output in Spain, Gaul, the Alpine region and the Balkans, as well as in the southern half of Britain. Gold and silver issues co-existed and varied in relative prevalence depending on the local metal supply.
At the early stages of 'Aegean' coinage, small denominations were invariably expressed in fractional silver coins of frequently minuscule weight (down to 0.2g), which
were produced in what could be very large quantities and predominantly for local use.
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Fractional bronze coinage that combined low value with greater user-friendliness only appeared in the mid-to-late fifth century BC. Bronze gained greater importance in the Hellenistic successor states, especially in Ptolemaic Egypt. It played only a limited role in the Parthian empire but was more common among the Greco-Bactrians and in the early Sasanid period.
In Italy, the archaic tradition of producing heavy metal bars of bronze (from c200 to c400 grams) that was found among Etruscans, Samnites and in Rome was gradually superseded by the introduction of Greek-style silver coins. Within the territories under Roman control, this process commenced with the production of Campanian silver staters from the late fourth century BC onward, followed by the quadrigatus and denarius silver coins in the second half of the third century BC. Bronze money shrank to coin-sized items and was increasingly marginalized by silver: by the second century BC, bronze may not have accounted for more than 10-15% of the aggregate value of the Roman money stock.
6 Roman expansion initiated a protracted process of monetary unification: the absorption and re-coining of much eastern Mediterranean silver in the first century BC and the concurrent demise of local precious-metal coinages in the western Mediterranean and its hinterlands; massive injections of coined gold from the mid-first century BC onward that created a trimetallic system of gold, silver and base metal coins, dominated -in terms of value -by gold and silver; the destruction of Greek-style provincial silver coinages in the eastern Mediterranean in the mid-third century AD; and repeated re-minting programs and standardized empire-wide re-issues of new formats since the early fourth century AD. Progressive debasement of the imperial silver currency in the third century AD created a de facto -and, from the 370s, formal -two-tier system of (stable) gold coin and (unstable) base metal coin, the latter subject to cyclical debasement and inflation. The late Roman gold standard survived in the Byzantine empire via the solidus and later the hyperpyron, complemented by bronze coins, all the way up to the fourteenth century.
Under late Roman and Sasanid influence, the kingdom of Axum in Ethiopia produced gold and silver coins from perhaps as early as the third century AD into the Middle Ages. Starting in the fifth century AD, imitations of Roman coins also appeared in the western parts of the disintegrated Roman empire, including silver and bronze coins of the Vandals (fifth/sixth centuries AD), gold, silver and bronze of the Ostrogoths (sixth century AD), mostly gold of the Visigoths (fifth to eighth centuries AD), the Suebians of Spain (fifth/sixth centuries AD), and the Lombards in Italy (since the late sixth century AD), while the Merovingian Franks shifted from gold to silver. From the eighth to the twelfth centuries, the latter was essentially the only metal used in western European minting. Gold coin returned in the thirteenth century and regular base-metal denominations in the fifteenth century, in both cases spurred by Italian pioneer issues. With European colonization, these extensions of the 'Aegean' currency tradition gradually spread all over the globe.
The creation and perpetuation of Chinese coinage
East Asia was the only exception. In the first millennium BC, China had developed a separate type of coinage that was characterized by the inclusion of a central hole in round coins (in China as well as in the secondary monetary traditions of Korea, Vietnam and Japan) and, more importantly, by the complete dominance of base-metal coins (a Chinese feature that was not always replicated by neighboring cultures). The whole region did not fully adopt 'Aegean' conventions until growing western influence and the introduction of foreign equipment facilitated the transition to solid coins in Japan (after the Meiji Restoration of 1867) and Korea (in the 1880s), and to solid as well as precious-metal coins in China (mostly in the late nineteenth century). The shunning of precious-metal coinage by successive Chinese dynasties over the course of more than 2,000 years marks out China as unique among all state-level societies that used coin, and raises two questions: Why did Chinese coinage develop differently from the 'Aegean' model, and why was its distinctive character maintained for a very long time even as economic circumstances changed and contact with 'Aegean' coin gradually intensified? These are complex problems that require much more detailed analysis than is possible here.
Historical overview
In pre-imperial China, money took the form of cowries shells, both originals and -increasingly -bronze imitations, tortoise shells, weighed gold and (rarely) silver bars, and most notably -from at least 1000 BC onward -utensil money in the shape of spade blades and knives made of bronze.
7 Initially large and quasi-functional, utensil money gradually shrank in size and weight until monetary objects ranged from about 7 to 30 grams. Round coin appeared in the fourth century BC in the states of the central Great Plain, the economically most developed part of early China: likewise manufactured of bronze and endowed with (mostly square) holes, these objects may have been modeled on earlier similarly shaped but much more valuable jade disks, and were cast according to regional weight standards with a variety of legends but no pictures. With the kingdom of Qin's conquest of the rival warring states in the 220s BC, the Qin banliang (i.e., 'halfounce' [7.6g]) coin became the official standard throughout the region, at least in theory if not immediately in practice. This imperial bronze currency was supplemented by gold that circulated as bullion, a two-tier system that was retained by the early Han dynasty (from 206 BC onward) which relied on a combination of gold (weighed but only occasionally cast in units of 1 jin = 16 liang, or 244 grams) and increasingly underweight banliang coins. In the 110s BC, the reformist emperor Wu imposed a state monopoly on the production of bronze coins and replaced the (nominal) banliang issues with the wuzhu ('five grains') bronze coin of 3.2 grams. For more than three centuries, with only a brief interruption during the Wang Mang usurpation of AD 6-23, wuzhu coins were cast in very large quantities: a textual reference to the production of 28 billion coins within a little over 110 years implies a mean annual output of some 230 million coins (using 750 tons of bronze), which translates to 7 or 8 coins per second. 8 Notwithstanding considerable weight debasement in the early Han period, the annalistic tradition suggests that -within certain margins of tolerance -the intrinsic (metal) value of coins was supposed to match their nominal value. 9 A Qin law from the mid-third century BC that required subjects to accept 'round coins' at their face value regardless of their actual weight and sought to outlaw the weighing of coin for private transactions will best be taken to reflect metallistic preferences among civilians. This reading is supported by a Han memorial of 175 BC which observes that in market transactions, additional coins were added to compensate for underweight specimens: intrinsic value trumped nominal value. 10 Furthermore, sporadic experimentation with strongly overvalued token coins under Wu and especially under Wang Mang reportedly triggered widespread resistance, counterfeiting, and probably price inflation. 11 The success of the wuzhu system for over three centuries of Han rule depended both on availability (i.e., massive output) and reliability (i.e., reasonably solid standards of weight and purity): in a pilot study of weighed wuzhu coins kept at the Département des Monnaies, Médailles et Antiques in Paris, I have been able to show that from the late second century BC to the late second century AD, the imperial mint consistently focused on the official target weight, and that variations from the mean averaged out in larger samples.
12 By contrast, renewed recourse to token coins in the third century AD quickly resulted in inflation and currency collapse. 13 In keeping with earlier custom, Han gold circulated as ingots, often in the shape of (hollow) deer hoofs. Currently known from 26 findspots in 14 different provinces, these objects varied greatly in terms of weight as well as purity, and were frequently cut into pieces, presumably to facilitate exchange.
14 The extent of gold use for commercial purposes is unknown: gold is primarily mentioned in the context of imperial gifts and expenses and within aristocratic circles, although small-scale gold use by commoners is not unheard of. Taken at face value, some of the reported aggegate values are very considerable: 200 tons of gold supposedly disbursed by the emperor Wu (140-87 BC) and 150 tons of gold hoarded in the palace of Wang Mang (AD 23) rival the largest known accumulation of gold in the Roman world and would in principle bestow major monetary importance on gold as a means of exchange and store of value. 15 However, it is unclear how many references to jin refer to actual gold or merely represent units of account for allocations that were in fact made in bronze coins. 16 In any case, the sources for the Eastern Han period (AD 25-220) tally a mere 5 tons of gold handed out as imperial gifts, while silver and even silk assumed greater importance.
17 This apparent scarcity of gold persisted to varying degrees under later dynasties, causing later observers to marvel at references to huge gold stocks in the Western Han and Xin periods, which casts further doubt on the true meaning of these reports.
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In the most general terms, the dichotomy of uncoined precious metals and coined base metals that had emerged in the pre-imperial period and had been formalized under the Qin and Han dynasties survived until the end of the nineteenth century. 19 The Tang dynasty (618-907) introduced the bao ('treasure') coins, essentially a revamped version of the wuzhu format, while gold and silver ingots were used as a store of value and for international transactions. 20 In the Northern Song period (960-1127), economic expansion necessitated huge increases in the production of bronze coins and their supplementation by iron issues, until paper money was introduced in 1160 under the Southern Song (1127-1279) to augment the money supply. Paper money, increasingly less adequately backed by precious metal stocks, gained in importance in the Yuan (1271-1368) and early Ming (1368-1644) periods, until it was de facto abandoned in the 1430s. From then on, uncoined silver took over, greatly boosted by the influx of large quantities of silver from the New World and Japan from the mid-sixteenth century onward. Song coin remained of great importance under the Yuan, and private production of bronze coinage eclipsed occasional attempts by the Ming state to revive public minting. Bronze coin once again assumed greater importance in the Qing period 
Causation
Why did the early Chinese states privilege bronze coins and -with a single exception (see below) -refrain from coining precious metals? An answer to this question requires consideration of the interplay of several variables: in the following, I focus on the bullion supply; military structures; political and ideological motivations; and path dependence.
The metal supply was arguably of critical importance. The earliest 'Aegean' coins were made of electrum found on Mount Tmolos and in the Paktolos River in Lydia: it has even been argued that this alloy's variable gold and silver content might have encouraged the creation of the coin format per se. 23 Silver dominated the Greek currency system thanks to the deposits of Attica, Thrace, Siphnos, and Samos. Central Asian and Indian gold supported the Kushan and Gupta dinars. Gold issues by Celtic polities were driven by supply, just as bullion imports from Nubia and the Senegal/Niger region accounted for the temporary shift from silver to gold currencies in the early Islamic Middle East, the opening of new mines in twelfth-and thirteenth-century Europe ended the previous monetary recession, fourteenth-century gold imports from Guinea facilitated the reintroduction of gold coinage in late medieval Italy, the discovery of rich Tyrolean silver mines in the fifteenth century and subsequent massive transfers from the newly acquired Spanish territories of Mexico and Peru sustained the production and eventual dominance of heavy silver coins in western Europe, and Brazilian gold supported the later British gold currency. 24 In the Roman period, the conquest and exploitation of previously marginal gold-rich regions such as north-western Spain, Bosnia and Dacia had given a massive boost to the Roman imperial gold currency. No comparable resources were available in the Chinese heartland. While the lack of ancient Chinese statistics forestalls direct comparisons between the Roman and Han empires, references to gold and silver output in later dynasties points to dramatic imbalances in the precious metal supply. In the first century AD, the Baebelo mines in Spain reportedly netted 35.4 tons of silver in state revenue alone per year, while the gold mines of Asturia and Bosnia yielded 6.5 and 5.8 tons per year, respectively.
25 These data compare extremely favorably with reports that silver mining yields in the entire Tang empire totaled perhaps half a ton per year, and not more than one ton at their peak (or perhaps up to five times as much if these tallies refer to tax revenue on mining output, still far below Roman levels). Under the early Song, annual output figures ranged from 5.4 to 8.2 tons of silver, with a peak of 33 tons 22 Peng, Monetary history, 668-706. Public gold issues were virtually non-existent (689). 23 R. B. Wallace, 'The origin of electrum coinage ', AJA 91 (1987), 385-97. 24 A good example is the Boii's switch from gold to silver after their move from Bohemia to Slovakia around 60 BC (Göbl, Antike Numismatik 118 Differences in military practice may also help account for the popularity of precious-metal coins in western and central Eurasia and the dominance of bronze coin in ancient China. The incentives for the creation of the earliest coin issues in the Aegean continue to be much debated, and it is true that military demands do not appear to have played a central role, despite the fact that the need to pay mercenaries was once mooted as a possible motive.
28 It is also clear that archaic Greek coinage, once it had been adopted by a large number of poleis, was frequently used for market exchange (especially the large quantities of small denominations), and not merely or even predominantly for military purposes. At the same time, the gradual spread of precious-metal coinage beyond the very particular environment of the Greek polis was arguably much more forcefully driven by military concerns: while the Hellenistic kingdoms, imperial Carthage, and midRepublican Rome are the most unambiguous examples, various Iranian empires or Iberian and Celtic polities may well belong in the same category. High value and low weight made silver coins in particular useful media for the compensation of professional soldiers, especially compared to unwieldy high-bulk and low-value base metal denominations. In ancient China, the conscription of large numbers of civilians by increasingly well-organized and coercive imperial states obviated the need for cash payments on a large scale. 29 There is no clear evidence of monetary stipends in the Warring States and Western Han periods: assuming that troops were provisioned in kind, bronze cash would have been adequate for small additional outlays. 30 It need not be a coincidence that when the early Tang dynasty restored a uniform imperial bronze currency, it operated a military mobilization system that combined military service with farming, and did not require high-value coin for military payments. 31 Moreover, the only western power that initially relied on comparable practices of mass conscription, the Roman Republic, did not feel a pressing need to adopt Greek-style silver coinage until it entered large-scale conflict with Greek and Hellenized competitors, but issued instead 26 (large) bronze denominations for stipends and other disbursements. 32 Ancient China, by contrast, was never drawn into an environment dominated by precious-metal coinage.
Political circumstances likewise favored a monopoly of bronze coin in early imperial China. The southern state of Chu, one of the main contenders for supremacy over the whole region, was the only (comparatively) gold-rich region in ancient China proper: gleaned from rivers, the gold of Chu accounts for all known finds of gold bullion and the majority of finds of gold objects from the Warring States period. 33 From the fifth to the third centuries BC, the government of Chu oversaw the production of small squares of gold that were cast as parts of large sheets stamped with a series of (ideally) rectangular seal marks. Individual squares could be broken or cut off for separate use. Each stamp bore the denomination (yuan) and the name of the Chu capital. Though surviving specimens vary considerably in shape and weight, two samples of reasonably well-preserved rectangles yield a mean weight of approximately 15 grams, which is consistent with a target weight of 1 liang (15.3g).
34 At 1.9 times the weight of an Augustan aureus or 3.4 times the weight of a Constantinian solidus, this renders the average Chu gold unit functionally equivalent to a large gold coin. The actual monetary importance of these gold rectangles is obscure: according to an observer from the Song period over 1,000 years later, "very many people" had found specimens in the ground and in rivers, which may indicate that they had not been uncommon and had perhaps been used in similar ways as 'Aegean' precious-metal coins. 35 There is no indication that these gold plates were issued beyond Chu's conquest by Qin in 223 BC: while specimens continued to be hoarded into the Eastern Han period, the nature of these items -with the name of the rival Chu capital stamped on the obverse -makes it highly unlikely that they could be manufactured under the centralizing Qin regime. As a later source observed, 'if the coinage is unified, the people will not serve two masters' (Hanshu 24B:5b) . A possible parallel in the form of gold ornaments with inscribed weights found at Yanxiadu, the capital of the northern state of Yan from 311 to 222 BC, likewise does not appear to have outlasted the Qin conquest: in this case, however, even less is known about the purpose of these items. 36 Overall, we need to combine the factors of metal supply and conquest: whereas only Chu produced enough bullion to maintain a proto-coinage in gold 32 See briefly M. H. Crawford, Coinage and money under the Roman Republic: Italy and the Mediterranean economy (London, 1985) , 22-3, on the introduction of army pay using aes grave in 406 BC. 33 while the other states relied on bronze, the ultimate success of Qin (with its bronze banliang coins) led to the suppression of alternative forms of cast money. We can only speculate what might have happened if Chu had emerged victorious: while supply constraints would still have militated against the creation of an imperial gold currency on the Roman scale, precious-metal denominations could well have been retained as a potent symbol of the conquering power. The actual outcome of the conflict between Qin and Chu adds an element of contingency to the fundamental ecological constraints imposed by the metal supply and the systemic features of military service.
This raises related issues, those of ideological conservatism and attendant path dependence. The triumph of the 'bronze-coin' state of Qin over the 'gold-square' state of Chu and assorted other rivals lies behind the later statement that 'actual gold which weighed one yi was given the name "currency of the first class", and while the copper coins were the same as the Zhou cash on the reverse surface, their inscription read banliang, and their weight accorded with the legend' (Hanshu 24B:3a) . Although this claim is untrue in so far as there is no evidence of normed yi-sized gold ingots and the actual weight of the banliang coins regularly fell short of half a liang, it may nevertheless reflect the official standard that imposed uniform -if notional -conventions and sought to define 'proper' money to the extent that not even silver was deemed an acceptable monetary medium: according to this version of the new imperial reality, 'pearls, jade, tortoise [shell] , cowries, silver, and tin … were not money' (ibid.). The Han regime, though at least initially rather weak and unable to enforce monetary regulations across its heterogeneous realm, officially adopted equivalent arrangements. Once this system had been in place for several centuries, any deviation from the putatively 'universal' goldbar/bronze-coin norm of a universal empire seemed remarkable: this is why the use of silver or gold for the manufacturing of coins was specifically noted among the strange habits of distant barbarians such as Parthians and Romans. 37 When the Chinese state finally encountered 'Aegean' coinage after its expansion into the Tarim Basin of Xinjiang that bordered on the emerging Kushan empire, hybrids in the form of solid coins with Hellenic (or Greco-Indian) motifs on one side and Chinese symbols (or weight marks) on the other one ensued but remained confined to that transitional frontier. 38 Sasanid and early Byzantine precious-metal coins that later arrived in China proper ended up as jewelry. The issue of massive amounts of Qin-Han-style bronze coins became a defining characteristic of the restorationist dynasties of Tang and Song. As the pedigree of the dichotomy of uncoined precious metal bars and coined base metal kept growing with increasing age, precious metal-coins became ever less conceivable. A real-life counterfactual is conveniently provided by Japan, which began to imitate early Tang coins from the late seventh century AD onward. In the first phase of production, in the Nara and Heian periods, the dominant copper issues were occasionally supplemented by silver (and once even gold) coinage. Following a prolonged hiatus beginning in the tenth century when Japan relied on imported Song cash, the revival of minting in the fifteenth century once again generated gold and silver coins alongside the greatly expanding growing copper currency.
39 Despite strong Chinese influence with respect to design and the conventional emphasis on low-value copper cash, the Japanese were perfectly willing to convert precious metals into coin. 40 By far the strongest evidence of Chinese monetary path dependence is furnished by the fact that even after the influx of thousands of tons of silver from Japan and especially from the Spanish colonies in the New World enabled late Ming China to maintain a silver-based monetary system, silver continued to circulate as weighed bullion and was never converted into regular coin.
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Taken together, the environmental, military, and political conditions detailed in this section help us understand why the early Chinese states mostly relied on low-value bronze coins (tool-shaped or round), alternative formats were suppressed upon imperial unification, and the Qin and early Han regimes endeavored to impose a two-tier currency system of uncoined gold and coined bronze. However, while these factors may arguably be sufficient to account for the initial characteristics of Chinese coinage, they fail to explain the subsequent rigidity of the monetary tradition in the face of changing circumstances. Thus, the shift to professional armies first in the Eastern Han period and once again under the late Tang and the Song failed to encourage the introduction of (objectively useful) precious-metal coin, while a dramatic increase in the silver supply in the late Ming period likewise proved to be of no consequence for the character of the imperial coinage. This long-term inflexibility stands in marked contrast not only to China's own willingness to experiment with paper money on a large scale but also to the monetary traditions of a large number of historical states that repeatedly adapted their currency systems to changes in metal supply or monetary demand. Against this background, ideological traditions must be assumed to have been instrumental in maintaining the conventional metallistic model. 'Path dependence' is merely a description of a process, and not its explanation: the roots of China's monetary exceptionalism may need to be sought in the specific properties of the belief system that shaped the decisions of the imperial ruling class, a search that calls for a cross-cultural perspective. Comparative monetary history requires us to draw on a wide variety of variables well beyond the sphere of -ultimately descriptive -numismatics.
Further questions
What is the utility of macro-historical comparisons of this kind? It is difficult to assess the significance and causal mechanisms of a particular historical developmentsuch as the creation of precious-metal coinage -without considering alternatives, be it hypothetical counterfactuals (asking what would have had to be different in order to 39 The earliest archaeologically known coins only slightly pre-date the canonical date of AD 708 for the first emission: The Japan Times 20 January 1999. Korea and Annam (Vietnam) , by contrast, were more closely integrated into the Chinese cash system and did not mint precious-metal coins until the nineteenth century: P. Grierson, Numismatics (London, Oxford, and New York, 1975) , 64-5, 70-1. 41 Von Glahn, Fountain of fortune, 113-41. generate different outcomes, which in turn helps identify the critical features that resulted in observed outcomes) or actual counterexamples, such as the bronze-coinage tradition of imperial China (enabling us to ask what did in fact happen differently, and why). Thus far, my survey has focused on explaining specific developments in China -what I have termed Chinese 'monetary exceptionalism' -as if developments in other parts of the world could safely be considered 'normal', that is, not in comparable need of explication.
In some sense, this position, while undoubtedly politically incorrect (imputing as it does normative status to 'western' conventions), need not be entirely without merit. 'Normal', understood in purely quantitative terms, does not necessarily entail value judgments but merely denotes relative frequency. In this respect, 'Aegean' coinage, in its manifold global manifestations, would seem to have a strong claim to normative status: many different societies across the world saw some merit in coins made of gold and silver, and issued them accordingly. At the same time, we must bear in mind that the expansion of 'Aegean' conventions owed much to successful imperialism (most notably the eastern conquests of Alexander the Great or the western conquests of Rome) or its indirect consequences. The adoption of precious-metal coinage by societies that had previously had little use for it (such as Carthaginians or Romans, or various Central Asian regimes succeeding the Greco-Bactrian kings) in the context of their incorporation into an established Hellenistic 'world system' may reflect another case of -selfreinforcing -path dependence: the more prevalent these coins became, and the more they were associated with dominant powers, the more likely they were to be adopted by outsiders and newcomers.
In the final analysis, there is nothing inherently 'normal' or inevitable about the conversion of gold and silver into standardized coin: the minting of precious metals entails losses through surface wear that could be reduced by the exchange of more substantial ingots (although the apportioning of gold or silver into small slivers similarly causes wastage), and -from the vantage point of established elites -might have the socially and politically undesirable consequences of undermining traditional hierarchies by concentrating considerable wealth in standardized and exceedingly mobile units of exchange, an aspect that has recently attracted attention in studies of the impact of Archaic Greek coinage. 42 The main pragmatic advantage of precious-metal coin may be located at the intermediate level between the use of individual base-metal denominations for petty transactions and the -functionally interchangeable -use of either gold and silver bars or large numbers of gold and silver coins. The Jiuzhang suanshu, a mathematical manual of the Western Han period, suggests that seven cows could change hands for 173 grams of gold, whereas in other examples the same transaction would require between 27 and 41 kilograms of bronze coins: no (official) intermediate media were available (8.7-8 & 11 ). Yet it is primarily -and perhaps even exclusively -in the military sphere that the portability and fungibility of normed units of silver in particular would greatly outweigh the utility of either tiny amounts of cut precious metal or large numbers of bronze coins.
The Phoenician and Carthaginian experience shows that there is nothing inevitable about coinage: for a considerable amount of time, trade and other interaction with the coin-bearing Greeks prompted little or no desire for imitation. 43 Coins are not inherently irresistible. Nor, as the Chinese case demonstrates, is the coining of gold and silver a logical corollary of the minting of bronze: the latter may occur on a vast scale even in the complete absence of the former. It also shows that superficially similar conditions fail to encourage comparable design choices. Both Archaic Greek coins and the utensil money and round coins of Warring States China developed in environments of political fragmentation and inter-state competition: yet whereas Greek issues from the beginning emphasized sacred images and other community-related symbols, Chinese states favored the less intuitively distinctive combination of central hole and peripheral legend.
The eventual near-global success of the 'Aegean' tradition might tempt us to assume that gold and silver issues with pictorial imagery represent a default position in coin production. The Chinese experience, however, establishes that large-scale coin use requires neither precious metals nor pictures. Inevitably, a sample of two (that is, two independent instances of the invention of coinage) makes it impossible to judge the 'typicality' of either case. As I argued above, both the circumstances surrounding the creation of the ancient Chinese imperial currency system and the reasons for its long-term durability (alongside greater flexibility within China's own sphere of monetary influence, such as in Japan) warrant careful consideration and comparative analysis. Yet the same applies in equal measure to the specific characteristics of the 'Aegean' model: was an appetite for putting small normed precious-metal objects with vibrant imagery in the hands of commoners a peculiar function of the nature of the Greek polis? Recent research suggests that there may well have been something quintessentially 'Greek' about this process. 44 Enhanced awareness of the 'Chinese alternative' and its genesis will aid us in the vital task of de-familiarizing and re-problematizing the 'Aegean' experience.
